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A Return to Institutionalization Despite
Olmstead v. L.C.?
The Inadequacy of Medicaid Provider
Reimbursement in Minnesota and the
Failure to Deliver Home- and Community-
Based Waiver Services
Sandra L. Yue*
"[B]eyond the legislative record [of the Americans with
Disabilities Act], it defies common sense to suggest that the
perpetrators of pervasive discrimination against people with
disabilities did not include agents of the States. "I
* J.D. expected 2002, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1997, summa cum
laude, University of California at Berkeley. The author is grateful to the
Minnesota Disability Law Center, and Anne Henry, Pamela Hoopes, Bud
Rosenfield, and Luther Granquist in particular, for the inspiration behind this
Note, their invaluable suggestions, and guidance. Many thanks to the Journal
editorial staff for their technical assistance and to Joseph Windsor and Luke
Shanahan for their stalwart friendship and insight.
1. Brief of Amici Curiae State of Minnesota et al. at 17, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Ala. v. Garrett, No. 99-1240, slip op. (U.S. Feb. 21, 2001). In February 2001, the
Supreme Court held in Garrett that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
barred recovery of money damages in suits by state employees against a state
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, No. 99-1240, 2001 WL 173556, at *3 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2001). The
plaintiffs, a nurse with breast cancer and a security officer with chronic asthma,
claimed that Alabama had discriminated against them in their employment
because of their disabilities. See id. at *3-4. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendant, claiming that the ADA exceeded Congress' authority to
abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by its own citizens,
but the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. See id. at *4. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. See id. at *11. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a narrow five-to-four majority, reasoned that
Congress, when it passed the ADA, made a general finding that individuals with
disabilities suffered a long history of discrimination. See id. at *8. However,
Congress never specifically identified a pattern of employment discrimination by
the states. See id. Because Congress' power to impose a legislative remedy
pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment must be "congruent and proportional to the
targeted violation," it overstepped its authority to permit individuals to recover
money damages against the state. Id. at *11. Title I of the ADA prohibits
discrimination in employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994), while Title II
applies to public services and programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994). The
Court in Garrett ruled only on the constitutionality of Title I. See Garrett, 2001 WL
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Introduction
In May 1992, L.C., a woman with retardation diagnosed with
schizophrenia was voluntarily admitted to the psychiatric unit of
the Georgia Regional Hospital for treatment.2  Though her
treatment team at the hospital determined by May 1993 that her
needs could be appropriately met in a state-supported community-
based program, L.C. remained institutionalized until February
1996 because of inadequate funding. 3 While still institutionalized,
she filed suit against the State in May 1995, claiming that her
continued confinement violated Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).4 Title II prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability in the provision of public services. 5 The district
court, in granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs L.C.
and E.W., held that the State's failure to place them in a
community-based treatment program violated Title 11.6 The State
maintained that it had not violated the ADA because lack of
funding, rather than discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs'
disabilities, was the reason for the continued institutionalization. 7
The district court rejected this reasoning and held that inadequate
funding did not justify unnecessary institutional segregation.8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment but remanded for a reassessment of the State's cost-
based defense. 9 While the State had a duty to provide services in
an integrated community setting, its obligations were not
boundless. 10 The lack of funding defense would fail unless the
State could show that the additional expenditures for these women
were so unreasonable, given its mental health budget, that it
would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the State-provided
services. "
173556, at *3. This Note discusses Title II of the ADA.
2. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999).
3. See id. at 593-94.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994); see Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 C'[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such a disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.").
6. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593. E.W., a woman with mental retardation
diagnosed with a personality disorder, was also institutionalized at the same
hospital. See id. She intervened in L.C.'s action, stating an identical claim. See id.
7. See id. at 594.
8. See id.
9. See L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998).
10. See id. at 904.
11. Id. at 905.
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In 1999, the Supreme Court entered the fray, holding that
Title II requires states to provide community-based treatment to
persons with mental disabilities when "the State's treatment
professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the
affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the
resources available to the State and the needs of others with
mental disabilities."' 12 If these conditions are met, continued
institutional confinement is unjustified and constitutes disability
discrimination under the ADA. 13 The Court supported its broad
interpretation of discrimination on several grounds.14 The passage
of the ADA reflected Congress' determination that society had
historically segregated and isolated persons with disabilities, 15
while the text of the law itself equates segregation with
discrimination.16  The Court also looked to the ADA's
implementing regulations, 17  which contain an "integration
regulation" that mandates state administration of services in "the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities." 8  The Court concluded that
unjustified isolation was discrimination because institutionalized
persons must "relinquish participation in community life they
could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons
without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they
need without similar sacrifice."'19
In the wake of Olmstead's interpretation of Title II,
significant legal activity has occurred, with a number of states
questioning how to apply the decision to the deinstitutionalization
12. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
13. See id. at 597. The cost-defense issue raised in the lower courts was not
ignored, however. Indeed, the Court was more generous toward the states in its
reading of the fundamental alterations defense than the Circuit Court. See id. at
605-06; infra note 76 and accompanying text.
14. The majority rejected the State's narrow interpretation that
"discrimination" did not include instances of different treatment between members
of the same group. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598. It also favored a more
comprehensive view of discrimination than the dissent. See id. at 598-99 n.10.
Justice Thomas maintained that discrimination as traditionally understood
"requires a showing that a claimant received differential treatment vis-a-vis
members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described characteristic."
Id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. See id. at 588.
16. See id. at 589 n.1. The findings section of the ADA states that
discrimination persists in "critical areas" such as institutionalization. 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(3) (1994).
17. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592.
18. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2000).
19. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601.
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of persons with disabilities. 20 States' development of Olmstead-
compliant deinstitutionalization plans2' and class-action
challenges to states' failure to provide community-based care to
eligible, yet wait-listed, persons residing in institutions constitute
the bulk of legal activity since the decision. 22  For instance,
lawsuits recently filed in Arizona and California challenge the
states' failure to deinstitutionalize as a result of inadequate wages
paid to the direct care and professional staff.23 Plaintiffs in both
20. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. Key recent decisions
involving unreasonable delays in moving persons off waiting lists include Lewis v.
New Mexico Department of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D.N.M. 2000) (finding a
two- to seven-year wait for services clearly unreasonable); Boulet v. Cellucci, 107 F.
Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding that a reasonably prompt movement off
waiting list for Medicaid waiver services is within ninety days); Benjamin H. v.
Ohl, Civ. Action No. 3:99-0338 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999) (ordering state to
develop Olrnstead-compliant plan to eliminate waiting lists within a reasonable
wait time of ninety days). Deinstitutionalization involves both moving persons out
of institutions and into the community, as well as preventing institutional
placement in the first place. See MINN. DEPVT OF HUMAN SERVS., HOME CARE AND
HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK 7 (2000) [hereinafter HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING
BOOK].
21. States can demonstrate ADA compliance by having a "comprehensive,
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in
less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not
controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated."
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06. However, the Court's opinion gave no criteria by
which to measure the comprehensiveness or effectiveness of the plan, nor defined
what constitutes a reasonable pace.
22. The National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS)
reports that integration mandate suits have been filed by protection and advocacy
agencies in Michigan, California, Louisiana, Ohio, and Tennessee and by the
Indiana Civil Liberties Union on behalf of residents of Medicaid-funded nursing
homes who have been put on waiting lists for home- and community-based services.
Nat'l Ass'n of Protection & Advocacy Sys., Case Law and Case Settlements
Occurring Since the Olmstead v. L.C. Decision, at
http://www.protectionandadvocacy.comlcolmste.html (last modified Feb. 1, 2001).
In August 2000, a federal suit was filed in Colorado on behalf of three
developmentally disabled adults who were eligible, but waitlisted, for residential
programs under Medicaid. See Editorial, Care for Mentally Retarded the Issue:
State Is Sued for Failing to Provide Care Promptly; Our View: A Settlement Is
Preferable to a Loss in Court, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 26, 2000, at
60A.
23. In January 2000, the Arizona Center for Disability Law and the Native
American Protection & Advocacy Project filed suit in Ball v. Biedess, available at
http://oaksgroup.org/complaint, on behalf of a plaintiff class of persons found
eligible for home- and community-based services but who were not provided the full
amount of services prescribed in their care plans, putting them at continual risk of
institutionalization. See Gary A. Smith, Litigation Concerning Medicaid Services
for Persons with Developmental Disabilities: Status Report, POL'Y RES. BRIEF
(Research & Training Ctr. on Cmty. Living, Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, MN), Jan.
2001, at 13. In May 2000, a California complaint was filed in Sanchez v. Johnson,
available at http://oaksgroup.org/complaint, on behalf of a class of currently
institutionalized individuals with developmental disabilities. See Smith, supra at
13. It too claimed the State's violation, inter alia, of integration and other anti-
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complaints allege that they were prevented from receiving the care
they needed at home because the States' provider payment rates
were too low to attract a sufficient number of workers to the
market.24 Given that many individuals rely on Medicaid home-
and community-based services to allow them to live outside
institutional settings, inadequate provider wages thus pose a
major obstacle to state compliance with Olmstead's Title II
integration requirements. Furthermore, failure to increase wages
implicates violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,25 a
precursor to the ADA that contains similar language prohibiting
disability discrimination, 26 as well as Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, which governs the administration of the Medicaid
program. 27
Olmstead's definition of discrimination to include unjustified
isolation has particular currency for persons in Minnesota
receiving Medicaid services under the Home and Community
Based Services (HCBS) waiver program. 28 The current shortage of
home care workers in Minnesota poses a tremendous challenge to
its ability to navigate its ADA obligations under Olmstead and
Medicaid program requirements. This Note argues that
Minnesota's failure to increase wages paid to personal care
attendants (PCAs) contradicts not only specific mandates spelled
out in caselaw and statutes, but also the logic behind
deinstitutionalizing our disabled population. Section I, Part A
gives the historical and legal background of
deinstitutionalization. 29 Part B provides an overview of Medicaid,
including its HCBS waiver program.30 Part C presents the factors
discriminatory regulations in reimbursing community-based care providers at a
rate lower than that offered to institutions. See id. at 13-14.
24. See id.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
26. See infra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of § 504.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994).
28. The Medicaid HCBS waiver program allows states to furnish personal care
and other services for individuals with disabilities who, without them, would
require institutional care. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHABILITATIVE
SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF ExISTING LEGISLATION AFFECTING
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 50 (1988) [hereinafter DEP'T OF EDUC.]; discussion
infra Part I.B.2. See generally Jane Perkins & Manju Kulkarni, Nat'l Health Law
Program, Addressing Home and Community-based Waiver Waiting Lists Through
the Medicaid Program, at http://www.heatlhlaw.org/pubs/20005FactSheet-
hcbw.html (2000) (discussing the implications of Olmstead on the HCBS waiver
program as a way to reduce institutional placements).
29. See infra notes 34-84 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 85-154 and accompanying text.
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fueling the PCA labor shortage in Minnesota.3' Section II
analyzes the results of the convergence of factors laid out in
Section I. Part A examines the multiple effects of the shortage on
the PCA field, waiver recipients, and recipient families. It
concludes that because the shortage places these recipients at
direct risk of institutionalization, the state's inaction is poised to
become discrimination under the ADA, as interpreted by
Olmstead, and violates statutory requirements under the Medicaid
Act. 32 Finally, Part B offers some proposed changes to address
Minnesota's failure to deliver authorized PCA services. 33
I. Background
A. The Historical and Legal Background of
Deinstitutionalization of Individuals with Disabilities
1. Historical Background
Through the first half of the twentieth century, people with
mental retardation and other developmental disabilities either
received services in large public institutions or relied upon their
families for care, with little assistance from the government.3 4
Early cases evidenced two major themes in the treatment of the
disabled: eugenics measures to control their reproduction, and
forced institutionalization. 35 Buck v. Bell36 upheld a Virginia
statute providing for sterilization of "mental defectives" 37 on the
grounds that it would benefit society to "prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."38 With similar
31. See infra notes 155-178 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 179-218 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 219-248 and accompanying text.
34. See DeWayne Davis et al., Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures,
Deinstitutionalization of Persons with Developmental Disabilities: A Technical
Assistance Report for Legislators (2000),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/pub6683.htm (last visited Mar. 2,
2001).
35. See RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 3 (1995).
36. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
37. Id. at 205.
38. Id. at 207. The Court found that Virginia's policy of sterilizing "mental
defectives," that is, those with hereditary "insanity" or "imbecility," violated neither
due process nor equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 205-
08. The opinion is particularly remembered for Justice Holmes' justification of the
policy as promoting general social welfare:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices,
[Vol. 19:307
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motives, states would also frequently institutionalize people with
disabilities, claiming that such measures were needed to prevent
sexual relations, especially for women. 39 Institutionalization of
males with disabilities, on the other hand, was often justified as a
way to protect society from the "danger" they posed to public
safety.40
Until the late 1960s, the dual attitudes of paternalism and
fear ensured a segregated, institutionalized existence for people
with disabilities. 4' At first, claims of poor living conditions,
neglect and inhumane treatment grounded legal challenges to
institutionalization. 42 By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the
Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education43 decision, which
established that separation was inherently unequal, lent
momentum to deinstitutionalization. 44 The burgeoning civil rights
movement additionally fueled litigation efforts by disability rights
advocates seeking not only to improve living conditions, but to
move away from unnecessary institutionalization altogether. 45 In
the areas of mental retardation and mental illness, there was a
growing recognition among experts that individuals could benefit,
and even thrive, in less restrictive settings. 46 This change in
treatment approaches was grounded in a increased societal
emphasis on individual rights and personal autonomy. 47 As such,
the push for deinstitutionalization was also the push for the
development of income, housing, and community-based supports,
all geared toward maximizing integrated living, individual choice,
and active participation in treatment planning. 48
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.
Id. at 207.
39. See COLKER, supra note 35, at 4.
40. See id. at 4-5.
41. See LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW 6 (1995).
42. See Davis et al., supra note 34, at 4; ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S.
RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 2-3 (1996).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. See id. at 495.
45. See Davis et al., supra note 34, at 4; Joanne Karger, "Don't Tread on the
ADA". Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring and the Future of Community Integration
for Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (1999).
46. See LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 42, at 3.
47. See id. at 3-4.
48. See id. at 3-6; see also Davis et al., supra note 34, at 4-5 (explaining that
20011
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center49 represented a
victory for disability rights advocates and the
deinstitutionalization movement. In this case, the city denied a
zoning permit to plaintiffs, who wanted to open a group home for
those with retardation. 50 The Court found that denial of the
permit constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
because the denial was not rationally related to any legitimate
state purpose.5 1 In his concurrence, Justice Marshall noted that
continued isolation of persons with disabilities perpetuated
negative attitudes and irrational fears toward them, which in turn
deprived them of "much of what makes for human freedom and
fulfillment-the ability to form bonds and take part in the life of a
community."52 The Court would later return to this conclusion in
Olmstead, asserting that unnecessary institutionalization
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,
including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment."53
2. Legal Background: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
In influential class action suits challenging institutional
conditions in the early 1970s, the courts consistently concluded
that the civil rights of individuals with mental retardation and
other developmental disabilities were being violated.54 At this
time, a number of special interest groups representing persons
with specific mental and physical disabilities, such as cerebral
palsy and epilepsy, vigorously lobbied for disability rights in the
community.5 5 The key legislative impetus behind this movement
housing and income supports may also include supervision, therapy, and twenty-
four-hour medical care).
49. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
50. See id. at 436.
51. See id. at 450.
52. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
In reviewing the history of discrimination against persons with mental retardation,
Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's decision to hold the city ordinance
only to a rational-basis standard rather than subject it to heightened scrutiny. See
id. at 473.
53. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601 (1999).
54. See STEPHEN LUTzKY ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REVIEW OF
THE MEDICAID 1915(c) HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM
LITERATURE AND PROGRAM DATA 4 (2000).
55. See COMM'N ON MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N,
DISABILITY LAW AND POLICY: A COLLECTIVE VISION 6 (1999).
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was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.56 The Rehabilitation Act
authorizes federal support for training and job placement for
persons with physical and mental disabilities. 57 Section 504 of the
Act was the first federal statute to address discrimination against
persons with disabilities. 58 Also known as the "civil rights bill of
the disabled[,]" 59 it prohibits excluding persons from any federal
program on the basis of disability.60 Thus, § 504's protections
reach employment as well as access to institutions like public
schools, public transportation, hospitals, and welfare providers.6 1
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),62 put
more teeth into § 504's protections by broadening the requirement
of nondiscrimination to cover employment and accommodations in
the private sector. 63 Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability in the provision of public services. 64 Title
II's implementing regulations contain an "integration regulation"
modeled after those of § 504 and state that entities receiving
federal funding must "administer programs and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
56. See id. The Rehabilitation Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793-794
(1994). It amended older vocational rehabilitation legislation that focused on
providing employment training for disabled veterans after World War I. See
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 7.
57. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 28, at 141.
58. See Karger, supra note 45, at 1233.
59. ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989).
60. Section 504 reads, in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability.., shall, solely by
reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
61. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 41, at 8.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Title I of the ADA, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability in employment. Id. §§ 12111-12117. Title
II prohibits discrimination in access to public services, including public
transportation. Id. §§ 12131-12165. Title III pertains to public accommodations
and services operated by private entities, including architectural barriers. Id. §§
12181-12189. Title IV covers telecommunications relay services for persons with
hearing and speech impairments. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1994). Finally, Title V
covers miscellaneous topics, including attorney's fees and prohibition of retaliation
against those asserting of rights under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
63. See COLKER, supra note 35, at 19.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This provision reads, in relevant part: "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such a disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id.
2001]
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handicapped persons."65 In passing the ADA, "Congress for the
first time expressly referred to 'segregation' of persons with
disabilities as a 'form of discrimination,"' and recognized that it
"persists in the area of 'institutionalization."' 66
In Helen L. v. DiDario,67 the Third Circuit affirmed the
integration mandate of the ADA.68 Pennsylvania's health
professionals found the plaintiff eligible for home-based services
after she became disabled.69 However, because of lack of funding,
the State placed her on a waiting list for the attendant care she
needed to live outside a nursing home.7 0 The lower court granted
summary judgment for the Department of Welfare, holding that it
wait-listed her due to lack of funding, and therefore, it had not
discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. 71 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this reasoning, finding
that a denial of services in the most integrated setting appropriate
violates the ADA despite lack of funding.7 2 While the State raised
a "fundamental alterations" defense,7 3 the court responded by
stating that fiscal or administrative convenience was not a valid
justification in providing services in a segregated manner.74
In Olmstead, the Supreme Court further outlined the limits
of Title 11.75 While its broad interpretation of the "fundamental
alterations" defense would make it easier for states to raise this
objection,7 6 Olmstead is nonetheless vital for the integration
65. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1999). The language of the corresponding regulation
for the ADA is almost identical, extending coverage of the integration mandate to
'services" in addition to programs and activities for qualified individuals with
disabilities. Id. § 35.130(d).
66. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 589 n.1 (1999).
67. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff in this case was placed in a nursing
home after she became paralyzed from the waist down due to meningitis. See id. at
328.
68. See id. at 339.




73. The implementing regulations of the ADA offer states an affirmative
defense: "[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the
basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
entity." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1999).
74. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 338.
75. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the
Court's holding and reasoning in Olmstead).
76. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603-06 (1999). Karger argues that the
Supreme Court, in allowing states to look at fixed costs that still must be incurred
at institutions when a patient moves into community-based services rather than
[Vol. 19:307
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principles it asserted by defining discrimination more
comprehensively. 77  The Court recognized that unnecessary
institutionalization "perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life"78  and highlighted the detrimental effects
associated with institutional confinement. 79  It drew a clear
picture of discriminatory treatment that exists in these instances:
persons without disabilities are not required to give up
participation in community life to get medical services they need,
while plaintiffs-even after being found by the state to be eligible
for community-based services-must make this sacrifice.8 0
The Court recognized, however, that "[t]he State's
responsibility, once it provides community-based treatment to
qualified persons with disabilities, is not boundless."81  Yet it
provided only limited guidance for state compliance. The Court
did not define any specific criteria by which to determine the
comprehensiveness or effectiveness of a state's plan for placing
qualified individuals into integrated community settings. 82
Furthermore, it "contemplated only those situations involving
institutionalization; the decision did not address the extent to
using the circuit court's simple cost comparison model, has "given the states greater
opportunity to legitimize their reluctance to provide community placement."
Karger, supra note 45, at 1260. In the latter model, the comparison is between the
cost of providing services for the individual in the community versus the cost of
caring for that same individual in an institution. See id. at 1257. As part of a
fundamental alteration defense, the majority held that a state can also argue that
diversion of funds from institutional programs to home- and community-based
programs would alter the range of services a state can offer and thus constitute a
fundamental alteration. See id. at 1259-60. This, however, escapes the question of
whether an expansion of existing services, not the creation of new programs, is a
fundamental alteration. See id. at 1260. In short, Karger argues that these
interpretations by the majority, among other points, pushes states too little to
change their existing manner of service delivery. See id. at 1263.
77. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's basis
for adopting a broader definition of disability).
78. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600.
79. These include barriers to personal development, economic and educational
advancement, and social and cultural exposure. See id. at 600-01.
80. See id. at 601.
81. Id. at 603; see also Karger, supra note 45.
82. See supra note 21. In January 2000, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services sent a letter to all state Medicaid directors spelling out key
principles and practices states should consider in developing their plans. See NAT'L
ASS'N OF PROTECTION & ADVOCACY Sys., OLMSTEAD PROGRESS REPORT: DISABILITY
ADVOCATES ASSESS STATE IMPLEMENTATION AFTER ONE YEAR 4 (2000) [hereinafter
OLMSTEAD PROGRESS REPORT]. As of July 2000, no state developed a full Olmstead
plan that conforms to these principles. See id. Most states, however, at least took
initial steps to either develop a plan, review existing plans for compliance, or
determine the methods by which they can comply. See id.
2001]
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which a state's limitations of services to certain relatively
restrictive but community-based home settings could still be
discriminatory."8 3 Given these interpretative gaps in Olmstead,
commentators predict that disputes will arise regarding how much
cost a state should bear as they develop their Olmstead integration
plans, and that it is too early to know how courts will treat this
question.8 4
B. Medicaid and the Role of HCBS Waivers in
Deinstitutionalization
While Olmstead and the ADA assert important and far-
reaching disability rights principles, they are of limited force in
translating these principles into necessary budgetary action.8 5
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Olmstead noted that
budget questions are political decisions not within the reach of the
ADA.86 Indeed, state budget allocations are more properly
addressed by the Medicaid statute, which was enacted pursuant to
Congress' spending power, rather than the ADA, which was
enacted as civil rights legislation.87 The statutes and regulations
that implement the Medicaid program offer more specific
directives in regard to state financial obligations. 88  While
Olmstead was not a Medicaid case per se, it still has significant
implications for the administration of Medicaid home- and
community-based waiver programs, whose aim in large measure is
the deinstitutionalization of persons with disabilities.8 9
1. Medicaid
Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA)90 governs
Medicaid, a jointly-funded cooperative program between the
federal and state governments designed to provide medical
assistance for low-income persons and persons with disabilities. 9'
83. BUD ROSENFIELD, MINN. DISABILITY LAw CTR., THE INTEGRATION
MANDATE, OLMSTEAD AND BEYOND: AN OUTLINE FOR ADVOCATING UNDER THE ADA
IN THE RECEIPT OF PUBLIC SERVICES 2-3 (Mar. 2000).
84. See Perkins & Kulkarni, supra note 28.
85. See supra notes 21, 82 and accompanying text.
86. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 612-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
87. See Perkins & Kulkarni, supra note 28.
88. See id.
89. See MANJU KULKARNI, NAVL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET:
ACCESSING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 1-2 (2000).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994).
91. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 4. The federal rate of
reimbursement varies by state; at present it ranges from 50% to 76.82% of state
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With oversight from the federal Health Care Financing
Administration, Medicaid makes federal matching funds available
to the states for the costs they incur in providing covered
services.9 2 The Medicaid program covers more Americans than
any other health insurer and is the nation's largest single
purchaser of long-term care.9 3 In Minnesota, 58% of Medicaid
expenditures go toward long-term care of both the disabled and
non-disabled. 94 By enrollee population, persons with disabilities
comprise 13% of this state's participants in the program and
utilize 40% of total expenditures. 95
State participation in Medicaid is optional; however, if a state
chooses to participate, it is subject to federal requirements
outlined in Title XIX.96 Nonetheless, states have broad discretion
within federal guidelines to establish eligible beneficiary groups,
types of and ranges of services covered, payment levels for
services, and administrative and operating procedures. 97 To be
eligible for matching funds, the state must provide coverage to the
"categorically needy,"9 8 which include those who receive federally-
assisted income maintenance payments and persons with
disabilities who fall below certain income standards.99 In addition,
states have the option of extending eligibility to the "medically
needy," that is, persons whose income and/or resources exceed
state eligibility levels but who can "spend down" the excess on
medical expenses in order to meet them. 10 0
expenditures. 65 Fed. Reg. 8979-80 (Feb. 23, 2000). The federal government
currently reimburses Minnesota for 51.11% of its expenditures; thus, the state
carries 48.89% of the cost. Id.
92. See THE KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A
PRIMER 1 (1999) [hereinafter KAISER COMM'NI.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id. at 9 tbl.3.
95. Id. at 7 tbls. 1 & 8.
96. See Ark. Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1993).
97. 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (1999).
98. See Health Care Fin. Admin., Medicaid: A Brief Summary, at
http://www.hcfa.gov/pubforms/actuary/ormedmed/default4.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2001). Some categorically needy persons are individuals eligible for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, children under age 6 whose family income is at or below
133% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
recipients, and pregnant women whose family income is below 133% of the FPL.
Id.
99. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 28, at 45. In Minnesota, income limits vary
by applicant category, such as adults with children or pregnant women. See Minn.
Dep't of Human Servs., Minnesota's Medical Assistance (MA) (Medicaid) Program,
at http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/hlthcare/asstprog/mmap.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2001). In 2000, for example, the yearly income limit for a family of two was $6996,
while for a family of four, it was $9936. Id. at 4.
100. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 28, at 45. By taking into account the high
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2. Home- and Community-Based Services Waiver Program
From its inception in 1965 through the early 1980s, Medicaid
provided long-term care in institutional settings only. 10 1 While
states could provide some home care services at their option, the
only comprehensive long-term care available in Minnesota was in
an institutional setting until Title XIX was amended in 1981.102
Pursuant to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Congress added section 1915(c) to the SSA'0 3, allowing for the
waiver of certain federal statutory requirements to enable states
to provide personal care and other services to individuals who, but
for these services, would be institutionalized. 10 4 The original
motivation behind the Home- and Community-Based Services
waiver program rested on the belief that long-term care costs
would be contained if services were provided to some individuals
in a less expensive setting rather than in an institution.10 5 To
receive federal funding, states must demonstrate that the
proposed program is "cost neutral," meaning that average costs
under the waiver must be equal to or less than cost of services
without the waiver. 106
Pursuant to the HCBS waiver program, states can "waive"
some of the federal requirements normally attached to the
provision of Medicaid services in order to develop community-
medical expenses they incur, medically needy participants can reduce their income
to a level at or below their respective state's income eligibility level and thereby
establish eligibility for the program. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra
note 20, at 5.
101. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 28, at 49; see also LUTZKY ET AL., supra note
54, at 1.
102. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 7.
103. This section reads in relevant part:
The Secretary may by waiver provide that a State [Medicaid] plan
approved under this subchapter may include as "medical assistance" under
such plan payment for part or all of the cost of home or community-based
services... with respect to whom there has been a determination that but
for the provision of such services the individuals would require the level of
care provided in a hospital or nursing facility or intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded ....
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994).
104. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 28, at 50.
105. See LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 54, at 2. Various studies of the HCBS waiver
program show mixed results in measuring its cost-effectiveness against
institutional care. See id. at 31-32. Existing studies tend to focus on the home- and
community-based services in general, rather than on particular programs offered
under the waiver, and can vary widely depending on the assumptions relied upon
by the researching body. See id. at 32. Available evidence does suggest, however,
that the program "can result in cost savings if services are targeted in a manner
that maximizes the diversion from institutions." Id. at 33.
106. See id. at 2.
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based treatment alternatives. 0 7 With a waiver, states have the
flexibility to design the mix of services they will offer, identify
target populations to receive them, and limit services to certain
geographic regions, in order to best meet its population's needs. 08
Federal regulations specifically list seven services that may be
provided under the waiver, 109 and other services may be provided
in a state's Medicaid plan, subject to approval by the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA). 110 HCFA approval for a state
waiver program is initially granted for three years and must be
renewed every five years."'
The HCBS waiver program has grown to become
instrumental to the deinstitutionalization movement. Post-
Olmstead, the waiver program is the most common means states
use to increase community supports, and spending under the
program is the primary funding stream for
deinstitutionalization. 1 2  The HCFA "recognizes that many
individuals at risk of being placed in these facilities can be cared
for in their homes and communities, preserving their
independence and ties to family and friends at a cost no higher
than that of institutional care" through this program. .113
Minnesota's Department of Human Services (DHS) characterizes
the waiver as an "alternative care package" that allows people to
live in the community instead of going into an institution." 4
Currently there are 240 HCBS waiver programs operating
throughout the country, with every state participating." 5
107. Section 1915(c)(3) allows for the waiver of requirements of statewideness (§
1902(a)(1) of the SSA), comparability (§ 1902(a)(10)(B)), and income and resource
rules applicable in the community (§ 1902(a)(10)(C)(i)(III)). See 42 U.S.C. §
1396n(c)(3) (1994).
108. See § 1396n(c)(3).
109. These services are case management, homemaker, home health aide,
personal care, adult day health, habilitation, and respite care. See 42 C.F.R. §
440.180 (1999).
110. Other services needed to help participants avoid being placed in an
institution that a state may request include non-medical transportation, in-home
support services, minor home modifications, adult day care, and special community
services. See Health Care Fin. Admin., Home and Coninunity-Based Services
1915(c) Waivers, at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hpg4.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2000) [hereinafter 1915(C) Waivers]. Individuals with chronic mental illness may
also receive day treatment, psychosocial rehabilitation services, and clinic services.
See id.
111. See id. at 2.
112. See OLMSTEAD PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 82, at 5; see also LUTZKY ET
AL., supra note 54, at 7.
113, 1915(C) Waivers, supra note 110, at 1.
114. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 7.
115. See 1915(c) Waivers, supra note 110, at 2. Arizona runs an equivalent
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Spending on the waiver program has increased rapidly, with
total waiver expenditures jumping from $290 million to $10.4
billion between 1985 and 1999.116 Services provided under waivers
accounted for almost two-thirds of total Medicaid home- and
community-based spending in 1999, while in 1992, it only
composed two-fifths of this total. 1 7 Spending for waivers for the
developmentally disabled increased at about thirty percent per
annum between 1992 and 1997, outpacing spending for aged and
disabled waivers." 8
In Minnesota, the DHS administers Medicaid and the HCBS
waiver program. 1 9 In addition to services not offered in the state's
Medicaid plan, the waiver program offers state plan extensions
necessary to avoid institutionalization. 20 The state currently
operates five waivers: Elderly Waiver (EW), Mental Retardation or
Related Conditions (MR/RC), Community Alternatives for
Disabled Individuals (CADI), Community Alternatives for
Chronically Ill Individuals (CAC), and Traumatic Brain Injury
(TBI). 12 1 Individuals receiving services under the HCBS waiver
program have access to all the services already offered under the
Minnesota state plan, including home health care, personal care,
private duty nursing, and adult day care. 22 Five additional
services are only available to waiver recipients: non-institutional
residential services, structured day program services, case
management, respite care, and certain specialist services. 123
While the waiver program affords flexibility by allowing
states to bypass three federal requirements found in § 1902 of the
SSA,' 24 two key provisions cannot be waived: equal access and
reasonable promptness. 25 The equal access provision requires
program to the HCBS waiver program under § 1115 of the SSA, which permits
states to run demonstration waivers. See id.
116. See LUTzKY ET AL., supra note 54, at 8.
117. See id. at 7.
118. See id.
119. The HCBS waiver program is governed by MINN. STAT. § 256B.49 (2000).
120. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 8. "Extended
services allow more than the state plan in terms of type, amount, duration and
scope ...." Id.
121. See id. The CADI waiver provides services for individuals with disabilities
at risk of nursing home placement, while the CAC waiver provides services for
chronically ill individuals at risk of being admitted to the hospital. See id.
122. See id. at 9.
123. See id.
124. See supra note 107.
125. See JANE PERKINS, NAVL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, ASSURING HIGH QUALITY
HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED CARE THROUGH MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT
PROVISIONS 2 (Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with author).
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Medicaid agencies to set reimbursement rates high enough such
that recipients can have access to care providers at a level at least
equal to that of their non-Medicaid counterparts. 126 This provision
is enforceable against the states under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,127 which
allows both Medicaid service providers and recipients to bring an
action for deprivation of their civil rights. 128  Equal access
challenges to inadequate reimbursement rates typically argue that
budgetary concerns impermissibly drive a state's rate-setting
decision, rather than consideration of the "relevant factors" listed
in the statute (efficiency, economy, quality of care, and equal
access). 129 The circuit courts are split on whether the equal access
clause gives rise to procedural or substantive rights. 130
126. This provision states, in pertinent part, that a state Medicaid plan must:
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the
payment for, care and services available under the plan... to assure that
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, quality of care and are
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available
under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are
available to the general population in the geographic area.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2000).
127. The statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
128. See Ark. Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 1993). The court
found that a claim under the equal access clause involved a violation of a federal
right, not just federal law, and that Congress had not foreclosed a § 1983 remedy.
See id. at 528. In finding a violation of federal rights, the court determined that the
statutory provision was intended to benefit plaintiffs, created a binding obligation
on the states rather than merely expressed a congressional preference, and
contained language that was not too vague or amorphous for the judiciary to
enforce. See id.
129. See id. at 530-31 (citing an extensive list of precedent supporting the
proposition that budgetary considerations are not a conclusive factor in setting
rates); Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. Bullen, 866 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (D. Mass. 1994)
(asserting that budget may be considered, especially in tight economic times, but
not at the price of statutory compliance).
130. Challenges to provider rates will thus require different facts to demonstrate
violation of the equal access clause, depending on how the clause is interpreted.
The Eighth Circuit follows a procedural rights model, wherein equal access
requires states to consider the "relevant factors" during the rate-setting process.
See Ark. Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 530 (finding that budgetary concerns impermissibly
drove the State's decision rather than consideration of the relevant factors in
setting its rates); cf. Minn. Homecare Ass'n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir.
1997) ("The Medicaid Act mandates consideration of the equal access factors... in
the process of setting or changing payment rates," though it does not mandate any
particular methodology for doing so); see also Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houston,
20011
Law and Inequality
Under either interpretation, however, if the provider
reimbursement rate ultimately set does not enlist enough
providers to ensure equality of access to medical services, the state
fails to perform its statutory duty. The provision's primary thrust
is encouraging provider participation by setting rates at a level
that will attract providers to the market.' 31 For example, in Clark
v. Kizer,1 32 plaintiff-recipients challenged the State's Medicaid
reimbursement rates as being too low to attract dentists in
numbers that would ensure equal access to its Denti-Cal
program. 133  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals identified
provider participation and reimbursement as the two main criteria
to gauge access to providers and found in this case that California
had violated the equal access provision.13 4 The court found that a
forty percent provider participation rate clearly fell below the two-
thirds benchmark utilized by the Department of Health and
Human Services.135 Likewise, the court found that Denti-Cal
participants could not even meet their overhead expenses, much
less derive some marginal profit when they were reimbursed at a
forty percent rate for their services. 3 6 When rates are too low to
No. 99-491, 2000 WL 730344, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that, in formulating
payments, the State must consider the relevant factors, though it need not consider
every factor to the same degree). In contrast, circuits that follow a substantive
rights interpretation hold that the outcome of the rate-setting process, not the
consideration of factors, is what matters. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 93 F.3d at
1007 (deferring to the state agency's rate-setting decision and shifting the focus of
the inquiry to whether the results of the decision-making met the relevant factors);
Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting
that equal access clause requires State to produce results, not employ any
particular methodology for getting there). One district court put the mandate in
even starker terms: the equal access clause "does not require the State to 'consider'
anything; it requires the State to achieve a result .... [Slo far as (equal access] is
concerned, the State ordinarily can be as deliberative or as nonchalant as it
chooses, so long as it selects a payment structure and rates that in fact are
[consistent with the relevant factors]." Fla. Pharmacy Ass'n v. Cook, 17 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1298 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
131. See Ark. Med. Soc'y, 6 F.3d at 530; see also Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 866 F.
Supp. at 1454, rev'd and vacated in part by Visiting Nurse Ass'n v. Bullen, 93 F.3d
997 (1st Cir. 1996).
132. 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd in part by Clark v. Coye, 8 F.3d 26
(9th Cir. 1993) (affirming lower court injunction increasing the State's
reimbursement rate).
133. See id. at 575.
134. See id. at 576. The district court noted other criteria by which to gauge
compliance with equal access, including evidence of a steady stream of recipients
reporting difficulty in obtaining services, significant numbers of providers opting
out of the program, and admission of inadequate rates by the administering State
agency itself. See id. at 578.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 577.
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ensure access at least equal to that of the general population,
many courts have held that states are obligated to upwardly revise
rates until they achieve statutory compliance. 37
The reasonable promptness provision is likewise unwaivable
under section 1915(c). 138 States must ensure that "all individuals
wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan
shall have opportunity to do so," and that "such assistance shall be
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals."'139  Its implementing regulation requires state
agencies to "furnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any
delay caused by the agency's administrative procedures" and
"continue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals
until they are found to be ineligible."'140 Individuals found eligible
for home- and community-based services, but wait-listed for
unreasonably long periods of time, have invoked the reasonable
promptness provision in challenging the state's failure to provide
services. 141
In Boulet v. Celluci,142 for instance, the court issued an
injunction ordering Massachusetts to furnish waivered residential
habilitation services to eligible plaintiffs within ninety days of
their placement on a waiting list. 43 All of the plaintiffs had been
on the list for at least three years, with some waiting for over
ten. 44 As in the equal access cases, the court found the reasonable
promptness provision enforceable under § 1983,145 and identified
137. In DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
recipients eligible for care in skilled nursing facilities were routinely rejected by
facilities favoring private-pay and Medicare clients. The court interpreted the
equal access clause to require that the reimbursement rate be set at a level that
will engage sufficient numbers of providers to make the program meaningful in all
respects. See id. at 550. The clause requires that states attempt to rectify
deficiencies in patient access to medical services via rate-setting, even if those
deficiencies are the product of an undersupply of available facilities. See id. If
providers are not induced to offer their services readily, the state is obligated to set
rates "with a view toward enlarging the base of provider participation." Id. at 551;
see also Cal. Ass'n of Bioanalysts v. Rank, 577 F. Supp. 1342, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
("recipients or providers may bring an action to enjoin utilization of the rate
structure until it is upwardly revised"); supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text,
for rejection of the cost defense in the Helen L. case.
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (1994).
139. See id..
140. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.930a-.930b (2000).
141. See, e.g., Boulet v. Celluci, 107 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2000); Lewis v. New
Mexico Dep't of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d (D.N.M. 2000).
142. 107 F. Supp. 2d 61.
143. See id. at 82.
144. See id. at 67.
145. See id. at 71-73.
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the nexus between reasonably prompt delivery of services and
reimbursement rates, commenting that:
[t]he availability of settings depends ultimately upon
demand[,] and demand in this context undoubtedly turns to
some considerable degree on the likelihood of reimbursement
for the services necessary to function in such settings. The
rulings in this case ... are intended to encourage vendors to
be willing to provide both the settings and the services to meet
the promise of the Massachusetts waiver plan by assuring
reimbursement up to the waiver cap. 146
In Lewis v. New Mexico Department of Health147 a class of
persons with physical and developmental disabilities claimed that
their continued institutionalization and placement on a waiting
list for less restrictive waiver services violated the reasonable
promptness provision. 148 The district court denied the State's
motion to dismiss,1 49 finding that the delays were clearly
unreasonable when plaintiffs had been waiting for two to seven
years. 150 Even though the Medicaid Act mandates a 200-person
minimum for receipt of waiver services, the court held that the
scope of New Mexico's obligations was greater than this numerical
floor. 151 It maintained that just because "the State applies for a
waiver for a certain number of individuals[, this] does not prevent
the State from applying for a waiver to serve enough persons such
that it can provide waiver services to all eligible applicants with
'reasonable promptness."' 152
The court in Benjamin H. v. Oh1153 summarized the simple
rationale behind prohibiting states from raising budgetary
defenses to justify their failure to provide waivered services with
equal access or reasonable promptness:
States could easily renege on their part of the Medicaid
bargain by simply failing to appropriate sufficient funds.
Medicaid is an optional program. States are not required to
participate. Once they do elect to participate, however, they
must comply with federal requirements. That requires
146. Id. at 67.
147. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D.N.M. 2000).
148. See id. at 1221-22.
149. See id. at 1240.
150. See id. at 1235.
151. See id. at 1234.
152. Id. Interestingly, the court also refused to dismiss the § 1983 claim against
the governor. See id. at 1240. It found that his vetoing of funds for waiver
programs-despite knowledge that several hundred people were on waiting lists-
and submission of a budget that contained half of the requested funds amounted to
a denial of HCBS to plaintiffs. See id.
153. Civ. Action No. 3:99-0338 (S.D. W. Va. July 15, 1999).
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funding a sufficient budget to meet the needs of the
program. 154
In order to promote the deinstitutionalization of persons with
disabilities, realize the undeniable benefits of their integration
into the community, achieve the cost savings of a community-
based treatment approach, and fulfill its obligations under the
law, Minnesota must maintain the mechanisms that support the
program's existence.
C. The Personal Care Attendant (PCA) Workforce Shortage
Crisis
1. PCA Services
PCA services are one of the services offered under the HCBS
waiver program in Minnesota. 155 These services are provided to
individuals who are not residents of a hospital, nursing facility,
intermediate care facility for those with retardation, or institution
for mental disease. 156 They enable individuals to accomplish tasks
they would normally perform themselves if they did not have a
disability.157 Depending on the specific disability involved, PCAs
assist their clients with a wide range of tasks, including toileting,
skin care, range of motion exercises, respiratory assistance,
transfers, bathing and grooming, dressing, turning and
positioning, furnishing medication ordinarily self-administered,
application of prosthetics, cleaning equipment, food preparation
and feeding, and accompanying them for medical diagnosis and/or
treatment sessions.'5 8 Minnesota's DHS requires that a PCA must
be at least sixteen years old, possess competency acquired through
training and/or experience to perform required tasks, have the
ability to provide services according to the client's care plan,
respond appropriately to the client's needs, be able to report
change in the client's condition to a qualified professional
responsible for his or her care, as well as pass a criminal
background check. 159
154. Id. at 26.
155. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 9.
156. See Health Care Fin. Admin., Personal Care Services, at
http://www.hcfa.gov.medicaidItc4.htm (last updated Mar. 11, 1999).
157. See id.
158. See MINN. R. 9505.0335 (1999).
159. MINN. DEP'T OF HuMAN SERVS., DHS BULL. #00-56-26, "PCA CHOICE": A




Because of the home-based care that they provide, PCAs play
a vital role in allowing persons with disabilities to live outside
institutional settings and stay in their own communities. DHS
anticipates that total state Medicaid spending on home health care
services will increase at annual rate of fourteen percent between
1999 and 2003.160 Personal care assistants and private duty
nurses will constitute eighty-five percent of these expenditures. 161
The state's population of persons with disabilities is steadily
increasing, and each year, DHS increases the number of persons
eligible to receive waiver services. 162 Taken together, these factors
will undoubtedly impact the demand for PCA services.163
2. Minnesota's Labor Shortage and Its Impact on PCA
Availability
Minnesota's labor market continues to be one of the strongest
in the country, with a higher percentage of its labor force employed
than any other state, 164 and an unemployment rate below three
percent for the last thirty-four of thirty-five months. 65 Governor
Jesse Ventura observed that "[o]ur continuing low unemployment
rates reflect an unprecedented level of opportunity for all
Minnesota workers."' 66 The flipside to this success, however, is a
shortage of labor in certain occupational sectors. The workforce is
growing more slowly than the economy, and a larger number of
workers have skills that are mismatched for the job requirements
of both low- and high-skilled positions. 67 Growth in the service
sector is expected to add more than half of the new jobs in the
state between 1996 and 2006.168 Within the service sector, health
services employment is expected to increase by 21%, with the
largest gains expected in practitioners' offices, nursing and
160. See HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 10.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 9, 12.
163. See id. at 12.
164. The state has a 75.1% labor force participation rate as of June 2000. News
Release, Minn. Dep't of Econ. Sec., Minnesota Solidly at the Top in National
Rankings (June 28, 2000), http://www.mnworkforcecenter.org/news/nr2000/
mbc00028.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
165. See News Release, Minn. Dep't of Econ. Sec., Minnesota Unemployment
Rate Up But Continues Under Three Percent (Sept. 12, 2000),
http://www.mnworkforcecenter.org/news/nr2000/dph00O5.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2000).
166. Id.
167. See CITIZENS LEAGUE, HELP WANTED MORE OPPORTUNITIES THAN PEOPLE 1
(1998).
168. See MINN. DEP'T OF ECON. SEC., MINNESOTA EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK TO
2006, at 3 (1999).
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personal care facilities, and home healthcare service firms. 169
Within the healthcare industry itself, home health services were
the fastest growing component during the 1990s.170 Because of
this, employers expect great difficulty filling 54% of current
healthcare support openings.' 71
Employers in Minnesota appear to be experiencing particular
difficulty in recruiting and retaining PCAs. 172 PCAs are one of the
five groups within the larger healthcare support occupations that
have an above-average turnover rate, 173 with 65% of employers
reporting that they are "always hiring" for these jobs due to
vacancy. 7 4 PCA jobs are typically entry-level, 175 offer few benefits,
and pay a state average hourly wage of $7.71.176 During its Health
Professions Workforce Forum in January 2000, the Minnesota
Department of Health identified the need to step up recruitment
and retention efforts in the healthcare field. 77 It focused on the
need to increase reimbursement rates and benefits, as well as to
establish improved incentive structures, such as training, rewards
for experience, and opportunities for advancement. 7 8
169. David Senf, Where Is Job Growth Headed in Minnesota?, MINN. ECON.
TRENDS, Mar. 1999, at http://www.mnworkforcecenter.org/lmi/trends/
mar99/growth.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2000).
170. See MINN. STATE COLLS. AND UNIVS. & MINN. DEP'T OF ECON. SEC.,
OCCUPATIONS IN DEMAND: FINDINGS FROM VACANCY SURVEYS OF SELECTED
INDUSTRIES, FOURTH QUARTER OF 1999, at 9 (2000) [hereinafter OCCUPATIONS IN
DEMAND].
171. See id. at 20-21.
172. See id. at 20.
173. See id. at 22.
174. Id. at 66.
175. See id. at 22-23. Healthcare support jobs, including those as PCAs,
typically lack "well defined training pathways into an occupation .. " Id. at 23.
176. Of employers surveyed, only 39% offered vacation, 16% offered sick leave,
and 23% offered health benefits. Id. at 68. For comparison, the respective figures
for medical assistants are 100%, 90%, 100%; for dental assistants, 92%, 59%, 52%;
for nursing assistants, 74%, 71%, 58%; and the average for all healthcare support,
74%, 66%, 58%. Id. at 66.
177. Minn. Dep't of Health, Minnesota Health Professions Workforce Forunm
Executive Summary (2000), http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/chs/orhworkfrc.htm





A. Effects of the PCA Shortage
The collision of the PCA shortage and continued low
Medicaid provider reimbursement rates threatens the
deinstitutionalization effort in Minnesota, particularly with regard
to the operation of the HCBS waiver program. A primary barrier
to deinstitutionalization is the high staff turnover rate due to
inadequate wages and benefits for support personnel like PCAs in
community-based settings.18 0 More than just failing to attract
adequate numbers of PCAs to the market, low reimbursement
rates are directly tied to the competency of the workers that
ultimately do fill these positions, and the resulting decline in the
quality of services provided.18' Furthermore, Minnesota's failure
to deliver needed medical services because of low wages implicates
wider systemic issues, such as the role of provider agencies, the
effects on families now forced to provide the care themselves, and
the imminent threat of institutionalization resulting from such a
precarious status quo. 8 2  Inaction will seriously compromise
Minnesota's ability to adhere to the integration mandates
179. A bulk of the data upon which this analysis is built derives from telephone
interviews conducted by the author, working for the Minnesota Disability Law
Center, of recipients and parents of recipients of PCA and Private Duty Nursing
services under Medicaid and the HCBS Waivers program throughout Minnesota.
All names and identifying personal information have been omitted to protect
confidentiality. Hard copies of interview data are on file with the author.
180. See infra Part II.A.1. Commentators have identified a host of other barriers
to deinstitutionalization across the country, including resistance from communities
who regard the placement of small group homes in their neighborhoods as a blight,
inadequacy of formal training for medical providers serving disabled populations,
closure or movement of supporting institutions like treatment centers when large
institutions shut down, resistance by private for-profit institutional facilities,
federal funding bias toward uniform care and easier monitoring associated with
institutions, and occasional opposition from clients and families who see
institutions as a safe, secure form of public assistance. See Davis et al., supra note
34, at 15. Moreover, by maintaining dual systems of care, whereby states sustain
both large institutions and community living programs, funds for community living
will shrink as the per capita costs of keeping large facilities open increase. See id.
at 14. One study, conducted for the American Association on Mental Retardation,
identifies three main factors contributing to low wages in direct care occupations:
historical pay differences between men and women (direct care workers tend to be
women), a general wage bias against care-giving occupations, and a history of
limited funding to community organizations that got "locked in" when state
agencies entered the picture to provide reimbursement. See DAVID BRADDOCK &
DALE MITCHELL, RESIDENTIAL SERVICES AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 5-8 (Michael J. Begab ed. 1992).
181. See infra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text.
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embodied in Olmstead, the ADA, and § 504, rendering the state
itself an agent of discrimination. Unless Minnesota actively
remedies the inadequacy of PCA wages, its inaction will violate
the equal access and reasonable promptness provisions of the
Medicaid Act.
1. The Central Problem: Inadequate Reimbursement
Provider agencies, which employ and train the PCAs that
directly work with clients, are reimbursed by the state and take a
share of the funds for administrative overhead expenses before
passing the remainder in wages to the PCA.183 Inadequate state
reimbursement manifests itself not only in the low wages direct
care workers receive, but frequently in the lack of employee
benefits and reimbursement for transportation to clients' homes.184
As such, the PCA worker must absorb the cost of mileage,
gasoline, and time on the road, creating a major disincentive to
pursue this job.185 Also, after taking into account the physical and
emotional demands that can accompany providing personal care
services, an average hourly wage of $7.71 is especially low when
compared with those for other service occupations in Minnesota.18 6
Given this situation, provider agencies' difficulties in finding and
retaining PCAs to continually fill vacant positions is not
surprising.
183. See DHS BULL. #00-56-26, supra note 159, at 2. Besides hiring and
training, the agency assigns PCAs to clients, supervises the PCA, and handles
payroll and billing. See id. Many waiver participants express frustration at
agencies and feel they are unnecessary middlemen. See, e.g., Telephone Interview
8 (Sept. 22, 2000) (reporting that PCA gets six to eight dollars and fifty cents of
thirteen to fourteen dollars paid to agencies); Telephone Interview 27 (Nov. 3, 2000)
(reporting that PCA gets seven of twelve dollars); Telephone Interview 29 (Nov. 3,
2000) (reporting that her PCA of eleven years started at seven dollars per hour and
is now only up to nine dollars per hour; she does not understand why she even
needs an agency); Telephone Interview 30 (Nov. 6, 2000) (reporting that PCA gets
seven of the fourteen dollars paid to the agency).
184. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 15 (Oct. 6, 2000) (reporting that PCA's agency
did not reimburse for travel).
185. One mother recalls that "years ago" a local home health agency would even
pay for taxi fare in order to get PCAs out to clients' homes. Telephone Interview 29
(Oct. 3, 2000).
186. By way of comparison, the 1998 average hourly wage in Minnesota for
amusement and recreation attendants was $7.03, janitors $8.85, cashiers $7.31,
retail salespersons $8.89, taxi drivers $7.48, and vehicle washers $8.35. MINN.
DEP'T OF ECON. SEC., 1998 WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION,




2. Effects on PCA Workers and the Occupation
Lack of available staff and high turnover rates are immediate
effects of the low rate of reimbursement from the state. Without
adequate numbers of employees, providers are unable to supply
backup when PCAs call in sick, go on vacation, or otherwise do not
show up. 187 Clients frequently report that PCAs will show up for
only a brief period, sometimes just a few visits, before they quit.188
Besides its effect on PCA availability, low reimbursement rates
impact the quality and competency of the workers attracted to the
job. Agencies will often provide their PCAs with some preliminary
training, such as on sterile technique or how to move clients, but
PCAs do not require any licensure, specific experience, or formal
program completion.5 9 As such, employment as a PCA is typically
viewed as an entry-level, low-skill, low-paying, high-turnover
job. 190 In addition, it lacks opportunity for advancement and offers
few incentives for acquiring increased skills, striving for above
average performance, or providing support in dealing with more
difficult cases. 191 High school or college students tend to fill a
number of PCA positions in a part-time capacity and often quit
upon returning to school or graduating. 192 Moreover, work in
other settings, such as retail, can prove to be a more attractive
choice with higher or comparable compensation and more regular
hours. 193
187. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 19 (Oct. 16, 2000) (reporting that agency has
no backup to send when PCAs call in sick or take vacation); Telephone Interview 20
(Oct. 16, 2000) (reporting that there is rarely backup when PCAs call in sick or go
on vacation, and even if there is, the worker sent does not necessarily know what to
do because they have never been at her home); Telephone Interview 23 (Oct. 20,
2000) (reporting that no-shows and PCAs calling in sick at the last minute are
common occurrences).
188. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 16 (Oct. 9, 2000) (reporting that PCAs sent do
not stay for long because they are mostly students and have other activities going
on); Telephone Interview 29 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting that a PCA showed up for one
day and quit).
189. See, e.g, Telephone Interview 18 (Oct. 9, 2000) (reporting by a mother of
paralyzed child that PCAs have no training in catheterization or giving enemas, so
she has to train each new worker herself).
190. See TASK FORCE ON DIRECT SUPPORT WORKFORCE DEV., WORKFORCE ISSUES
SUPPORTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 7-8 (2000) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
191. See id. at 8.
192. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 24 (Oct. 23, 2000) (reporting that current
PCA is a high school student and previous PCA over summer was a college student
who stopped working to go back to school); Telephone Interview 28 (Nov. 3, 2000)
(reporting that child with autism has only had one PCA so far, a college student
who stayed a year but who stopped working to go back to school); Telephone
Interview 29 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting that students have typically been the PCAs
during the summers for child with brain damage).
193. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 23 (Oct. 20, 2000) (reporting that new Wal-
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3. Effects on Clients
Worker shortage, incompetency, and high turnover rates
present a host of negative effects on persons with disabilities who
rely on PCAs to provide supportive services that would allow them
to live at home rather than in an institution. The inability to find
PCAs, either through an agency or through their own efforts, is a
prevalent problem for waivered and non-waivered home care
recipients alike.194 Of all clients surveyed, none were receiving all
the hours for which they were authorized, and in more than a few
instances, they were receiving no PCA services at all.195 While a
few clients and their parents reported dissatisfaction only with the
number of hours filled, many indicated that the workers sent by
agencies were of questionable competency.' 96  Children with
mental and behavioral health problems often end up with merely a
babysitter-assuming they can even find a PCA to fill a portion of
their authorized hours-rather than a qualified health care
worker who can assist with their actual medical needs, such as
development of social, learning, and coping skills. 197
Mart being built in Rochester is more appealing; it offers better wages and
benefits); Telephone Interview 8 (Sept. 22, 2000) (reporting that PCAs are leaving
to work in hospitals, schools, and retail instead of providing care in homes);
Telephone Interview 30 (Nov. 6, 2000) (reporting by a father of a child with
emotional behavioral disorder that he has never heard of a PCA who left one
agency to work for another but rather, they leave the field entirely).
194. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 21 (Oct. 16, 2000) (reporting by a mother
that, of the 100 agencies she called, she could not find a single agency that had staff
to send); Telephone Interview 27 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting that she contacted fifty
agencies with none willing to take her case due to staff shortage).
195. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 26 (Oct. 30, 2000) (reporting seven and a half
hours per day authorized and zero hours delivered); Telephone Interview 27 (Nov.
3, 2000) (reporting four hours per day authorized and zero hours delivered);
Telephone Interview 28 (reporting fifteen and three-quarters hours per week
authorized and zero hours delivered).
196. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 15 (Oct. 6, 2000) (reporting by a client with
depression that her friend overheard PCA discussing client's case with a neighbor);
Telephone Interview 24 (Oct. 23, 2000) (reporting that PCA would fall asleep on the
job); Telephone Interview 25 (Oct. 30, 2000) (reporting that PCAs she worked with
had little experience or training dealing with people with mental illness; one PCA
kept borrowing money and another suggested that if she went to church, she would
not be mentally ill).
197. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 20 (Oct. 16, 2000) (reporting that high
turnover rate difficult for child with quadriplegia, mental retardation and
blindness; instead of regularity and structure, she must adapt and re-adapt to each
new worker); Telephone Interview 30 (Nov. 6, 2000) (reporting that children with
emotional behavioral disorder need PCA who knows how to deal with their specific
disabilities, not just clean up after them); Telephone Interview 21 (Oct. 16, 2000)
(reporting by a mother of child with mild retardation and schizo-affective disorder
that she needs PCA to help with child's development, not to babysit her).
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Especially for clients with more severe disabilities requiring
constant care and clients with mental illness, the worker shortage
has far deeper ramifications than just doing without services.
Without a PCA, a client may not be able to take a bath, care for
wounds, go to school, go to work, or even breathe. 198 In some
cases, going without the PCA services for which an individual is
entitled leads to hospitalization or institutionalization, either due
to an emergency arising from a lack of regular, necessary medical
support in the home, or because it becomes the only means to
access this support. 199 For example, one Elderly Waiver recipient
had to be hospitalized after she developed an infection at her
amputation site that went untreated. 200  Had a PCA been
available to change her prosthetic leg regularly or clean her
wounds early, she would not have had to go to the hospital.20 1
Nonetheless, she stated that the best part about being in the
hospital was being able to bathe for the first time in three
months. 202
4. Effects on Families of Clients
In many instances, recipients of HCBS waivers live with
their families in the community. However, because of the PCA
shortage, many family members find themselves having to provide
the care the state failed to deliver. Faced with lack of staff from
provider agencies, many families have placed their own
advertisements in newspapers or local schools and churches,
hoping to recruit workers directly. 203 Indeed, some agencies will
not even take on a case unless clients find their own PCAs.20 4 For
198. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 18 (Oct. 9, 2000) (reporting that client
paralyzed from chest down cannot ever be left alone or might choke); Telephone
Interview 19 (Oct. 16, 2000) (reporting that developmentally disabled waiver client
only able to take night classes due to PCA unavailability during day, jeopardizing
ability to have college career).
199. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 11 (Sept. 25, 2000) (reporting that son
institutionalized in psychiatric ward due to lack of PCA); Telephone Interview 16
(Oct. 9, 2000) (reporting by a mother that if son with depression and ADHD had
enough PCA supports, he would not have been placed in a residential mental
facility); Telephone Interview 23 (Oct. 20, 2000) (reporting by a quadriplegic client
that she was hospitalized three times in two years when no PCA came to help her
when she was ill with the flu and diarrhea).
200. See Telephone Interview 6 (Sept. 18, 2000).
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 28 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting by a mother of
child with autism that agency had no PCAs to send, but that she could find people
on her own); Telephone Interview 27 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting that agencies would
take on her case only if she found the PCA herself).
204. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 23 (Oct. 10, 2000) (reporting that child with
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those families that can afford it, some pay PCAs extra money
directly out of their own pockets, in order to provide the PCAs
incentives to stay. 20 5 Out-of-pocket payments are not the only
economic effect: in many cases, the caregiving family member
must quit or work fewer hours, assuming he or she can pursue
work at all. 206
The intangible effects on families are likewise great. There is
tremendous personal stress and physical exhaustion associated
with constantly having to care for, or arranging the care for, a
child or spouse with a disability.20 7 For instance, a mother of a
child with cerebral palsy reported that she even considered putting
her son into foster care because she simply "couldn't provide the
help he needed anymore" herself.208 Frustration runs high at not
being able to pursue one's own appointments and work plans. In
addition, the strain on other family relationships besides the one
between the caregiver and the recipient can be overwhelming.
20 9
quadriplegia being dropped by current agency due to lack of staff, while other
agencies mother is seeking as replacement are telling her that they cannot take on
her case unless she finds her own workers).
205. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 15 (Oct. 6, 2000) (reporting by a client with
depression that she pays PCA out of her own pocket to "make it worth her while" to
stay); Telephone Interview 22 (Oct. 20, 2000) (reporting by a mother of child with
cerebral palsy that she has not had a major problem with high turnover because
her family can afford to pay extra to retain a PCA).
206. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 8 (Sept. 22, 2000) (reporting by a mother that
she had to quit her job to care for son with cerebral palsy); Telephone Interview 11
(Sept. 25, 2000) (reporting by a mother that she has never worked because she has
to stay home to care for her three children with disabilities); Telephone Interview
12 (Sept. 25, 2000) (reporting by a mother that she used to have a "good paying job"
but had to quit and is now on public assistance); Telephone Interview 14 (Oct. 3,
2000) (reporting by a mother that she has never held a job since daughter with
disability was bern); Telephone Interview 27 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting by a mother
that "working is out of the question"); Telephone Interview 29 (Nov. 3, 2000)
(reporting by a mother that she cannot hold even a part-time job because she has to
care for daughter with brain damage); Telephone Interview 30 (Nov. 6, 2000)
(reporting by a mother of sons with emotional behavioral disorder that she has no
time to work at all).
207. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 13 (Sept. 29, 2000) (reporting by a
grandmother of traumatic brain injury waiver client that she has spent thirty-two
hours straight caring for him; grandmother herself is over seventy years old, has
arthritis, and has had to postpone her own surgeries to care for him).
208. Telephone Interview 10 (Sept. 25, 2000).
209. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 18 (Oct. 9, 2000) (reporting that family must
be split up in order to have an outing, because someone must stay at home to care
for daughter with paralysis); Telephone Interview 21 (Oct. 16, 2000) (reporting by a
mother that she has no free time to spend with her spouse and that child with
disability fights with siblings unless PCA is present to help with behavioral
problems); Telephone Interview 22 (Oct. 20, 2000) (reporting by a mother that she
feels guilty for not being able to spend more time with her other son, who does not
have disability); Telephone Interview 30 (Nov. 6, 2000) (reporting marital strain).
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Moreover, many family caregivers feel intense resentment at
having to assume those responsibilities the state failed to fulfill. 210
5. How the PCA Labor Shortage Implicates Minnesota's
Statutory Obligations
A primary goal of the HCBS waiver program is promoting the
benefits of living in the community rather than in an institution.2 11
Yet, for the Medicaid recipients in Minnesota who rely on
waivered PCA services, the unavailability of PCAs severely
compromises their-and their families'-ability to pursue
independent and fulfilling lives. If medical needs go unmet
because of a scarcity of workers to provide home care, Minnesotans
with disabilities are put at direct risk of institutionalization.
The current PCA workforce crisis is, at least in significant
measure, the result of inadequate wages paid under Medicaid. 212
Should low wages continue unaddressed, Minnesota will have
effectively shirked its statutory duties under the equal access and
reasonable promptness provisions of the Medicaid Act. Current
wage rates fail to attract sufficient numbers of providers to ensure
access that is equal to that enjoyed by individuals who can afford
to pay more.2 13  Simultaneously, the limits of reasonable
promptness are undoubtedly surpassed if authorized PCA hours
are never even furnished.21 4  Furthermore, the state violates
Olmstead's ADA Title II community integration mandate when its
failure to deliver authorized PCA services results in
institutionalization. 215 Given Minnesota's budget surplus, 2 16 its
ability to raise a "fundamental alterations" defense 2 17 should only
210. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 28 (Nov. 3, 2000) (reporting by a mother of
child with autism that caring for her son is her full time job, calling herself a "PCA
with no pay").
211. See discussion supra Parts I.A., I.B.2 (describing deinstitutionalization and
the role of the HCBS program in this movement).
212. See discussion supra Parts I.C.2, II.A.1 (detailing PCAs' low wages).
213. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. While an analysis of provider
reimbursement rates under other payment schemes like Medicare or private
insurance is beyond the scope of this Note, the fact that recipients who can afford to
pay PCAs extra out of their own pockets are willing to do so indicates that low
wages are a major barrier to equal access to services. It stands to reason that an
individual who can afford to pay more, from whatever source, will be more
attractive to a PCA, at least from the standpoint of financial incentives.
214. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (reporting accounts of
authorized time not delivered by PCAs).
215. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
216. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (suggesting injunctive relief).




be granted limited force. Moreover, under the caselaw of
Medicaid, equal access, and reasonable promptness, any budgetary
defense should be granted even less. 218
B. Proposed Solutions
Minnesota's DHS recognizes "the need to redesign the
current system to prepare for and meet future demands of growing
numbers of people ... with disabilities." 219 Proposed solutions
would target legislative efforts to inject greater flexibility and
consumer direction in the operation of the HCBS Waiver program
by expanding several existing home care options offered by
DHS.220 This effort should be coupled with the filing of class
action suits, such as those filed in California and Arizona, as a
means to place more immediate and direct pressure on the state to
make clearly-needed changes to the current program. 221
Meanwhile, the PCA worker shortage calls for a number of
changes in state policy that would both induce more and better-
qualified workers to enter the labor market. 222  Only with
increased PCA availability and competency will consumer
direction of services be a worthwhile option in keeping with the
waiver program's goal of allowing persons with disabilities to
receive the care they need at home or in their own communities.
1. Greater Consumer-Directed Control in the Delivery of
Services
Consumer direction "encompasses decision-making, personal
choice, self-advocacy, self-determination, and self-expression" in
the selection of services and service providers. 223 In order for
consumer direction to be effective, it must be sensitive to the
limitations specific to different disabilities. 224  For example,
children, families, and elderly people with fewer cognitive
impairments might prefer a greater degree of autonomy, while
218. See supra notes 124-154 and accompanying text (explaining the limits to
budgetary defenses under Medicaid Act in the face of inadequate provider
reimbursement rates).
219. HCBS WAIVERS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 20, at 11.
220. See infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing consumer direction).
221. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing injunctive relief).
222. See id. (discussing policy solutions).
223. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 54, at 23. States developing Olmstead plans are
actively incorporating language to reflect a commitment to promoting consumer
direction and choice, as well as including people with disabilities in plan
development and eliminating unnecessary institutionalization. See OLMSTEAD
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 82, at 7-10.
224. See LUTzKY ET AL., supra note 54, at 23.
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persons living alone or having greater cognitive impairments
might want less consumer direction but retain the option of hiring
a family or friend to be a care provider. 225
In Minnesota, the Consumer Support Grants (CSG)
program226 assists individuals with functional limitations and
their families in purchasing those supports, including PCA
services that the individual needs to "live independently and
productively in the community. 227  The program allows these
consumers to receive a cash grant equivalent to the non-federal
portion of services. 228 In effect, they trade their Medicaid home.
care services in exchange for only the state share of funds.229 In so
doing, the consumer can purchase needed services and supports in
a more flexible manner, because the administrative restraints that
normally are attached to the federal share do not come into play.23 0
As such, CSG participants can purchase PCA services from family
members, friends, or others without them having to be employed
by home care agencies first.23 1 The recipient and the participating
county develop an agreement specifying amounts of payment and
the services to be purchased with it, while the recipient must be
able to arrange for and purchase services on her own.23 2
Because the CSG allows family caregivers to be paid as PCAs
and permits a greater degree of individual choice in purchasing
services, the program is useful in addressing some of the effects of
the PCA shortage. 233 Given the worker shortage, getting only the
state share of Medicaid funds-and purchasing services under its
more flexible rules--can be more attractive than receiving
federally-matched, but more restrictive, funds. While extending
the terms of the CSG program to reach the federal share of
225. See id.
226. MINN. STAT. § 256.476 (1998) governs this program.
227. MINN. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., DHS BULL. #00-56-8, DHS REQUESTS
INFORMATION ON ESTIMATED PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSUMER SUPPORT PROGRAM,
Attachment A (May 26, 2000).
228. See id. at 2.
229. See ANNE L. HENRY, MINN. DISABILITY LAW CTR., DHS BUDGET LIMITS
CONSUMER SUPPORT PROGRAM, TAKES $15 MILLION SAVINGS 1-3 (2001).
230. See MINN. DEP'T OF FIN., STATE OF MINNESOTA 2002-03 BIENNIAL BUDGET
C-197 (2001), http://morefinance.state.mn.us/budget/operating/20022003/
recommendedrequests/125388.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2001) [hereinafter BIENNIAL
BUDGET].
231. See id.
232. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., Consumer Support Grants: "An Opportunity
to Manage Your Home Care", http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/agingint/Services/
csprog.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2000). Other services CSG participants can
purchase are chore, homemaker, and home health aide services. See id.
233. See supra Parts II.A.1-4 (discussing the effects of the PCA shortage).
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Medicaid would, of course, represent the greatest degree of
consumer control for Minnesotans in the program, approval of
such an extension is up to the federal government. 234 Despite the
obvious necessity for the CSG program in the meantime, however,
Governor Jesse Ventura recently proposed to cap participation in
the program at 200, in order to realize a savings of approximately
$15 million over fiscal years 2002-2003235 with no plans to reinvest
this money into disability services. 236  Given the fact that
inadequate wages paid to PCAs creates the very need for a
program like the CSG to prevent institutionalization, the proposed
participation cap amounts to another state failure to meet its
federal statutory obligations.
In October 2000, DHS announced a new service option
available to PCA recipients called "PCA Choice," whereby they
bypass the use of provider agencies in selecting their personal
service care provider.237 The recipient teams up with a qualified
professional, who assists with development of a care plan and
supervision, and a "PCA Choice Provider," who conducts billing
and payroll functions only.238 Meanwhile, the recipient can hire
and fire the PCA directly, as well as provide training specific to
her own needs.239 By teaming up responsibilities, DHS anticipates
that PCAs will be paid higher wages as a result of reducing
administrative overhead otherwise incurred by agencies. 240 While
this program is still very new, its design seems to address at least
several key problems PCA recipients and their families found with
the prior system. These included complaints that agencies took
too large a cut of the state reimbursement before paying its PCAs,
and that due to inadequate training, families would have to
retrain PCAs once they arrived to their home. 241 However, a major
drawback of this program is that PCAs cannot be a parent or
spouse of the person with the disability, unlike in the CSG
program. 242  Given that the central problem facing persons
receiving PCA services under the HCBS waiver is a sheer lack of
available workers in the market, the PCA Choice program appears
to be of limited utility for the present time.
234. See BIENNIAL BUDGET, supra note 230.
235. See id.
236. See HENRY, supra note 229, at 1-3.




241. See supra note 189 (reporting mothers having to "train" PCAs).
242. See DHS BULL. #00-56-26, supra note 159, at Attachment B.
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2. Injunctive Relief: Mandating Funding for Higher Wages
and Establishing Other Incentives
While consumer-directed programs are promising, they are
only partial solutions because of limitations on their scope of
application or their novelty. The use of legal injunctive pressure to
the state is still necessary to ameliorate such a widespread
problem. In November 2000, the Minnesota Department of
Finance projected a $924 million budget surplus for the fiscal year
2000-2001.243 The Department forecasts "continuing, very strong
economic growth" and expects a $2.086 billion budget surplus for
the 2002-2003 biennium. 244 Yet this budget surplus includes those
very funds Minnesota has saved by not fulfilling its HCBS waiver
program obligations completely.245  In light of this surplus,
Minnesota should not be allowed a viable lack-of-funds defense
under the ADA and the Olmstead decision if its failure to
deinstitutionalize is challenged in court. The state's failure to set
wages high enough to enlist PCAs in numbers that would ensure
equal access to services or reasonable promptness in their delivery
raises potential challenges under the Medicaid Act, wherein
caselaw has well established that budgetary considerations cannot
be the dispositive factor in setting reimbursement rates.246
Increasing wages and benefits would have effects greater
than simply attracting more PCAs to the market. Requiring more
competitive wages would likely draw more qualified and
experienced workers. 247 Moreover, it may also bring back PCAs
243. See MINN. DEP'T OF FIN., NOVEMBER FORECAST 1 (2000)
244. Id.
245. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (reporting non-fulfillment of
authorized hours).
246. See supra notes 67-74, 124-154 and accompanying text (discussing limits to
a lack of funds defense). Though a full analysis of the lack of funds defense is
beyond the scope of this Note, an additional economic consideration in favor of
injunctive pressure against the state is the fact that many family members, usually
mothers of PCA service recipients, are forced to stay at home because the state has
not provided all the hours necessary to keep recipients out of institutional care. See
supra note 206 (reporting by mothers that they have lost their jobs or cannot work).
One mother reported that a PCA who had worked for her family for eleven years
reduced her weekly hours from twenty-five to seven and a half. See Telephone
Interview 29 (Oct. 3, 2000). This PCA now works full time as a medical records
clerk in order to retain health insurance benefits for herself and her spouse, since
the provider agency did not offer them. See id. If PCAs are quitting in search of
full time jobs for medical benefits coverage, it stands to reason that mothers-
especially single mothers-who cannot even pursue work because they have to stay
at home to be caregivers-are likewise jeopardizing their own medical insurance
coverage. Removing these women from the workforce would presumably have
spillover effects in the areas of income tax revenue and consumer spending.
247. See OCCUPATIONS IN DEMAND, supra note 170, at 24.
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who enjoyed the work, but who quit solely because of low wages.
Simultaneously, the state should consider establishing
certification programs to train students in skills specific to
providing PCA services to people with physical and mental
disabilities. These programs could stand alone or be added onto
larger academic programs in health care occupations or social
work, in the manner of an externship. In so doing, certified
workers would be better positioned to demand higher wages.
Moreover, the existence of a recognized, structured training route
would lend more legitimacy, respect, and appeal to an occupation
too often characterized as low-skill, high-turnover, and lacking in
opportunities for career advancement. 248 Consumer choice will
only be meaningful to the extent that the choices themselves are.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's assertion in Olmstead that unjustified
institutionalization constituted disability discrimination defined a
principle with far-reaching implications for Minnesota's efforts to
deinstitutionalize. Through the use of the Home- and Community-
Based Services Waiver under the Medicaid program, the state is
equipped with a potentially powerful means by which to advance
this effort. However, in light of the current PCA labor shortage
crisis, the state has fallen short of its various statutory
obligations, only to pass off these duties to the families of persons
with disabilities. In so doing, the state violates the very logic
behind the existence of the HCBS waiver program. Without
effective measures to increase reimbursement to PCA workers that
will ensure equal access to and reasonably prompt provision of
services, Minnesota is setting the stage for a return to the
institutionalization of its residents with disabilities.
248. See TASK FORCE, supra note 190, at 7-8.
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